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Abstract  
 
The UK courts and the CJEU have often treated age discrimination as a less serious form of 
discrimination. This is reflected in the courts’ reluctance to offer rigorous scrutiny when evaluating 
whether age-differential treatment is objectively justified under anti-discrimination law. Further, 
a number of judges have asserted that age discrimination must be understood as different to other 
forms of discrimination, such as race or sex discrimination. This article argues that age 
discrimination is not fundamentally different or prima facie less serious than other forms of 
discrimination. Age discrimination can undermine the same principles that paradigm forms of 
discrimination also undermine, including: creating inequality of opportunity by disadvantaging 
people because of a trait that is outside a person’s control; undermining social equality by creating 
a hierarchy of social status between different groups; violating autonomy by diminishing people’s 
capacity to have control over their lives; and communicating disrespect by conveying that 
particular groups have a diminished moral or social worth. It follows, contrary to the approach of 
much of the case law, that the courts should offer rigorous scrutiny of age-differential treatment to 
identify these harms and only permit age distinctions that are strictly tailored to enhance equality 
or other important values.   
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Introduction 
Legal interventions concerning age were once generally limited to setting minimum age limits 
for activities such as marriage, leaving education, paid employment, consuming alcohol and 
driving and for establishing rules concerning retirement. However, concerns about the impact 
of the ageing population on economic growth, welfare costs and inter-generational fairness 
prompted the European Union (‘EU’) to pass the Employment Equality Framework Directive 
2000/78/EC (the ‘Framework Directive’) requiring EU member states to implement legislation 
prohibiting age discrimination.1 The United Kingdom (‘UK’) followed with the Employment 
Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 and later the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits unjustified 
unequal treatment on the grounds of age and disadvantaging particular age groups in access to 
employment, training and education; membership of associations and clubs and provision of 
goods and services.2 
Despite this legal intervention, age retains a reputation as a less serious ground of 
discrimination, and this has impacted on the level of scrutiny the courts have been willing to 
offer when evaluating whether age-differential treatment is objectively justified and therefore 
lawful under anti-discrimination law.3 The UK courts and the Court of Justice of the European 
                                                          
* Thanks to Virginia Mantouvalou, Hugh Collins, Joe Atkinson and the attendees of the London Labour Law 
Discussion Group who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 In 1999, the European Commission argued that legislation prohibiting age discrimination was necessary as part 
of a strategy to address the consequences of an ageing population and to enable and motivate older people to 
remain in work. See Commission, Towards a Europe for All Ages - Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational 
Solidarity (Com No 221, 1999). 
2 Equality Act 2010, s 13, s 19. 
3 This reputation is also evident in the academic literature. Posner, R in Aging and Old Age (Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press 1995) p 204 argued that age discrimination is not a real problem and that the concept 
only exists in the minds of ‘some radical egalitarians’ who ‘see discrimination everywhere.’ See also Issacharoff, 
S and Harris, E ‘Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution’ (1997) 72 
New York University Law Review 780 for the argument that age discrimination should not be prohibited because 
it does not reach the level of seriousness of race or sex discrimination.   
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Union (‘CJEU’) have often offered a low level of scrutiny in evaluating the justifiability of 
age-differential treatment, including a lack of scrutiny on the legitimacy of the defendant’s 
aims and a lack of engagement with the discriminatory impact of treatment.4 Furthermore, a 
number of judges at the UK and EU level have asserted that age discrimination must be 
understood as ‘different’ from other discrimination. 
Three major arguments have been used in support of understanding age discrimination 
as different and less serious, including: that age-differential treatment is often a rational means 
of promoting social and economic objectives; 5  that age-differential treatment can be 
compatible with equality of opportunity to a greater extent than other differential treatment;6 
and that age-differential treatment is not demeaning in the way other differential treatment is.7 
This article argues that, contrary to the above arguments, age discrimination should not 
be considered fundamentally different or prima facie less serious than other forms of 
discrimination. Age-differential treatment can be wrong, I argue, for the same reasons that race 
and sex-differential treatment can be wrong, namely, it can express animosity, convey 
demeaning ideas about people and can undermine autonomy and equality of opportunity. It 
follows that the courts and tribunals should rigorously scrutinise age-differential treatment for 
these harms.  
I aim to demonstrate an approach to age discrimination which requires courts and 
tribunals to evaluate the extent impugned age-differential treatment undermines the principles 
                                                          
4 This lack of scrutiny is revealed in Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA (411/05) [2007] ECR I-8531; 
Petersen v Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe (341/08) ECR I-00047; Rosenbladt 
v Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsgesellschaft mbH (45/09) ECR I-09391; Wolf v Stadt Frankfurt am Main (229/08) 
ECR I-00001; Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2012] UKSC 16; [2012] 3 All ER 130; and R v SS for Work 
and Pensions Ex p Carson and Reynolds [2005] UKHL 37; [2006] 1 AC 173. 
5 See Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA (411/05) [2007] ECR I-8531, Opinion of AG Mazák, para 62. 
6 See Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2012] UKSC 16; [2012] 3 All ER 130, para 4. 
7 See R v SS for Work and Pensions Ex p Carson and Reynolds [2005] UKHL 37; [2006] 1 AC 173, para 60. 
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that paradigm forms of discrimination undermine, which I argue includes: equality of 
opportunity (which requires that people should not be made worse off on grounds that someone 
cannot be held responsible for), social equality (which holds that it is wrong when conditions 
produce hierarchies of status), respect (which prohibits expressions of insults or messages that 
certain people are worthy of lesser concern and respect) and autonomy (which prohibits actions 
that unfairly diminish a person's opportunities for autonomous agency). 
To illustrate this approach, I compare and contrast the theory of age discrimination 
defended in this article to the approaches in three significant UK age discrimination cases that 
have accorded age discrimination a lower moral status. I consider Seldon v Clarkson Wright & 
Jakes8 – the leading UK age discrimination case concerning retirement ages; Lockwood v 
Department of Work and Pensions & Anor,9  which related to lower redundancy pay for 
younger people; and, finally, R v SS for Work and Pensions Ex p Carson and Reynolds,10 which 
concerned the lower rate of jobseekers’ allowance for people under the age of 25. These cases 
illustrate a reliance on ageist assumptions and stereotypes in justifying age-differential 
treatment. I re-work the cases to illustrate a framework that accords weight to the moral 
seriousness of age discrimination. Further to this, I demonstrate the difference the framework 
should make to the legal and moral reasoning in the cases. In selecting these cases, I intend to 
offer a detailed account of the philosophical analysis outlined in this article rather than offering 
a complete outline of the CJEU, UK and European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) 
jurisprudence.11  
                                                          
8 [2012] UKSC 16; [2012] 3 All ER 130. 
9 [2013] EWCA Civ 1195, [2014] 1 All ER 250. 
10 [2005] UKHL 37, [2005] 4 All ER 545. 
11  For a detailed overview of the CJEU jurisprudence on age discrimination, see O'Cinneide, C ‘Age 
Discrimination and the European Court of Justice: EU Equality Law Comes of Age’ (2009) 2 Revue des affaires 
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I structure this article as follows: firstly, I explain that the age discrimination laws in 
the EU and UK require that courts and tribunals consider the moral status of age discrimination 
as part of the process of identifying unjustified and unlawful age discrimination; secondly, I 
outline theories of the moral status of age discrimination presented in the case law and 
academic literature; thirdly, I explain that, contrary to the approaches in the case law and 
academic literature, age discrimination is not fundamentally different or a prima facie less 
serious ground of discrimination; and, fourthly, I illustrate this argumentation by comparing 
and contrasting the theory of age discrimination defended in this article to the approaches 
adopted in the case law.    
 
Age Discrimination Laws Require Moral Reasoning about Age 
Discrimination 
Establishing the moral status of age discrimination is essential to the proper application of age 
discrimination laws in the EU and UK. This is because age discrimination laws distinguish 
justified age-differential treatment, which is lawful, from unjustified age-differential treatment, 
which is not.12 To make this distinction, courts and tribunals must engage with theoretical 
questions about when it is unjustified to treat people less favourably on the grounds of age and 
when it is unjustified to disadvantage particular age groups. For example, Article 6 of the 
Framework Directive asserts that 
                                                          
europeennes 253. There are a limited number of ECHR cases on age discrimination, but the Strasbourg court has 
held that age-differential treatment engages Article 14 of the ECHR. In Schwizgebel v Switzerland App no 
25762/07 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010), the Strasbourg Court held that a policy that denied a 47 year old women the 
option of adoption because of her age was age-differential treatment that engaged Article 14. Also, the House of 
Lords in Carson and Reynolds affirmed that Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits age-differential treatment in the 
UK unless the treatment is objectively justified. 
12 See Equality Act 2010, s 13(2), s 19; Framework Directive, Article 6; and Article 14 of the ECHR. 
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Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not 
constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and 
reasonably justified by a legitimate aim ... and if the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. 
 
The Framework Directive will continue to take effect in the UK even after the UK withdraws 
from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 will transpose the already existing 
EU law, including the Framework Directive, into UK law. 
Consider also section 13(2) of the Equality Act 2010 that provides that age-differential 
treatment does not constitute unlawful age discrimination in the UK if the treatment is a 
‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’ and Article 14 of the ECHR, which secures 
the enjoyment of ECHR rights ‘without discrimination’ on grounds including age unless the 
differential treatment is proportionate to a legitimate objective.13 
Each of these laws that are applicable in the UK require judges to assess the 
proportionality of impugned treatment, which requires an assessment of whether impugned 
treatment furthers 'legitimate aims’ that are important enough to justify treating people 
unequally on the grounds of age and an assessment of whether impugned treatment achieves 
an appropriate balance between the discriminatory impact of the treatment against the values 
promoted by the treatment.14 This proportionality assessment requires courts and tribunals to 
consider the seriousness of the discriminatory harms of age-differential treatment. Further to 
                                                          
13 See the Schwizgebel case for authority that age-differential treatment engages Article 14. 
14 In Seldon v Clarkson, Wright and Jakes [2012] UKSC 16, [2012] ICR 716, the UK Supreme Court held this is 
the appropriate test for proportionality assessments in age discrimination cases. 
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making this assessment, courts and tribunals should consider whether age-differential 
treatment is capable of being as serious as paradigm forms of discrimination. If it is, then courts 
and tribunals should undertake a high level of scrutiny to identify the wrongs that paradigm 
forms of discrimination are capable of inflicting. 
In the next section, I consider the arguments in the case law and the academic literature 
for understanding age discrimination as different or prima facie less serious than other forms 
of discrimination. I later argue these accounts are unconvincing. 
 
The Arguments that Age Discrimination is Different  
Mazák AG’s opinion in the CJEU case Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA15 argued 
that age-differential treatment is different to other forms of discrimination because it is 
‘common in social and employment policies’.16  He argued that the Framework Directive, 
which prohibits age-differential treatment, should not apply to the impugned national 
retirement age because ‘it would... be very problematic to have this Sword of Damocles 
hanging over all national provisions laying down retirement ages, especially as retirement ages 
are closely linked with areas like social and employment policies where the primary powers 
remain with the Member States...’.17 This implies that the CJEU should avoid rigorous scrutiny 
of the justifiability of age-differential treatment, such as retirement ages. 
In Age Concern, Mazák AG reiterated his view that age is different because ‘age-limits 
and age-related measures are…widespread in law and in social and employment legislation in 
                                                          
15 (411/05) [2007] ECR I-8531. 
16 Ibid, Opinion of AG Mazák, para 62. 
17 Ibid, para 64. 
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particular.’18 He asserted that ‘[a]ge is not by its nature a “suspect ground”, at least not so much 
as for example race or sex’,19  implying that age-differential treatment is less invidious than 
other forms of discrimination.  
In the UK Supreme Court case Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes,20 Lady Hale 
outlined an equality of opportunity argument for treating age discrimination as ‘different’. In 
this case, Lady Hale asserted that 'age is different... not "binary" in nature (man or woman, 
black or white, gay or straight) but a continuum which changes over time... younger people 
will eventually benefit from a provision which favours older employees, such as an incremental 
pay scale; but older employees will already have benefitted from a provision which favours 
younger people, such as a mandatory retirement age’.21 The nature of age means that people 
may experience the different advantages and disadvantages associated with different age 
groups, and this means that age-differential treatment can be compatible with equality of 
opportunity measured over a complete life. This is the explanation, Lady Hale argued, for anti-
discrimination law permitting proportionate direct age-differential treatment but only 
permitting differential treatment on other grounds in a much narrower range of circumstances.22 
In R v SS for Work and Pensions Ex p Carson and Reynolds,23 Lord Walker held that 
age classifications are 'different in kind' from other more potent classifications, such as race or 
sex, because classifying people by age is not 'intrinsically demeaning' in the way that race or 
                                                          
18 (388/07) ECR I-01569, Opinion of Mazák AG, para 74. 
19 Ibid. 
20 [2012] UKSC 16; [2012] 3 All ER 130. 
21 Ibid, para 4. 
22 Ibid. 
23 [2005] UKHL 37; [2006] 1 AC 173. 
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sex classifications are, and therefore a lower level of judicial scrutiny was appropriate when 
evaluating whether the impugned treatment is objectively justified.24   
In the academic literature, Richard Posner has argued that age discrimination is not 
analogous to invidious forms of discrimination, such as race or sex discrimination, because age 
can be an efficient proxy for characteristics that are important for employers, including job 
capability.25 Age-based rules are typically simpler to administer than making assessments of 
individual employees and thus can bring about cost savings. Age discrimination in 
employment, Posner argues, represents the demands of competitive pressures for rational 
employment policies rather than prejudice.  
Posner acknowledges that people subject to an age distinction will not always have the 
characteristic that the age distinction is a proxy for. This is due to variance in people’s 
capabilities. However, age distinctions can still be justified for Posner because age distinctions 
are less costly than assessing individuals directly. Prohibiting employers from using age 
distinctions can lead to higher labour costs which are likely to be passed on to younger workers 
in the form of reduced wages or benefits. 
Samuel Issacharoff and Erica Worth Harris have argued that age discrimination is 
different because age discrimination laws in the United States do not protect any group that is 
                                                          
24 Ibid, para 60. This is similar reasoning to the US Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia 
(1976) 438 US 285, which held that older people ‘have not experienced a “history of purposeful unequal 
treatment” or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative 
of their abilities’ (at 313).  
25 Posner, R ‘Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and Sexual Harassment’ (1999) 19.4 International 
Review of Law and Economics 421. 
Accepted pre-proofed version (21.1.2019)  
Forthcoming in Legal Studies 
  
 
  10 
 
socially reviled, penurious, or cut off from the mainstream of society and/or marked by the 
badge of social opprobrium.26  
In another account, Axel Gosseries has argued that there are two features of age 
discrimination that make it ‘special’, including its efficiency and that it can reduce inequality.27 
In line with Posner’s argument, Gosseries argues that age criteria can be relatively reliable 
proxies for intellectual and physical development, at least at young and old age. Age proxies 
can reduce the costs of pursuing valuable social goals by sequencing people’s lives to undertake 
a course of action at a particular point in the life cycle when individuals and society receive the 
most benefit from the activity. For example, we can maximise the benefits of education by 
forcing people to undertake education prior to actually putting it in practice. 
Secondly, age criteria can reduce inequalities over complete lives because age 
distinctions can apply to everyone to ensure they can equally experience a particular 
opportunity e.g. voting from 18 years old. Gosseries has argued that age-differential treatment 
can reduce inequalities by distributing from an age cohort that has experienced favourable 
opportunities to another cohort that has been disadvantaged in comparison. For example, 
consider economic conditions that have resulted in a particular age cohort having a higher 
unemployment rate than an older cohort experienced at an equivalent age. A mandatory 
retirement age might aim to redistribute opportunities from older people who have already 
experienced comparatively favourable employment opportunities to younger people who have 
had fewer of these opportunities. 
                                                          
26  Issacharoff, S and Harris, E ‘Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination: The ADEA's Unnatural 
Solution’ (1997) 72 New York University Law Review 780. 
27 Gosseries, A 'What Makes Age Discrimination Special? A Philosophical Look at the ECJ Case Law' (2014) 
43.1 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 59. 
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In the next section, I argue that, contrary to the above arguments, age discrimination 
can inflict the same types of harms as other discrimination and, in the circumstances where 
age-differential treatment can be justified, it can be justified for the same reasons that other 
forms of differential treatment can be justified. In other words, age-differential treatment is not 
different or special or necessarily less serious.  
 
Age Discrimination can Match the Harms of Paradigm forms of 
Discrimination  
From the cases and academic commentary outlined above, we have three major rationales 
justifying treating age as a less serious ground of discrimination, including: that age is not a 
suspect ground because age distinctions are often rational methods of promoting valuable 
social and economic objectives; that age distinctions can be compatible with equality of 
opportunity to the extent that other distinctions are not; and that age distinctions are not 
demeaning in the way that other distinctions are.  
To examine whether these arguments are persuasive for treating age discrimination as 
a less serious form of discrimination, we must examine whether age discrimination can match 
the wrongs of paradigm forms of discrimination. If this can be demonstrated, then this is an 
important reason to doubt the arguments that age discrimination is necessarily a less serious 
form of discrimination. 
To investigate this, we need to start by considering principles that explain why and 
when discrimination wrongs people and then determine whether these principles also explain 
the wrongs of age discrimination. Further to this, I consider four major principles, including: 
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equality of opportunity; social equality; autonomy; and respect. I also consider whether age is 
different because it can be ‘useful’ for achieving particular social and economic goals.  
 
Equality of opportunity 
Shlomi Segal has argued that ‘discrimination is bad as such...because and only because it 
undermines equality of opportunity.’28 All forms of wrongful discrimination, he has argued, 
are wrong because they cause inequality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity holds that 
inequalities are acceptable if they result from personal choices and unacceptable when they 
result from factors outside our control.29  
 Discrimination can cause unjust inequality of opportunity because discrimination 
disadvantages people, whether in services, employment or associations, on the grounds of a 
trait that a person cannot control and/or should not be held responsible for, including traits such 
as race, sex, gender and sexual orientation. Many of the protected characteristics in the Equality 
Act 2010 such as race, gender and nationality, are traits that people are powerless to change. 
Since every person is entitled to equal concern and respect, it is wrong to permit better 
conditions to particular people on an arbitrary basis, including on traits such as race, sex, gender 
and sexual orientation.  
But to what extent does equality of opportunity explain the wrong of age 
discrimination? As outlined above, Lady Hale has argued in Seldon that age discrimination is 
                                                          
28 Segal, S ‘What’s so Bad about Discrimination?’ (2012) 24 Utilitas 82 at 82. 
29 This is the luck egalitarian version of the equality of opportunity principle, which holds that it is wrong for a 
person to be worse off to the extent that they are not directly responsible for their condition of being worse off. 
The following have defended this principle: Segall, S Equality and Opportunity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2013); Mason, A Levelling the Playing Field: The Idea of Equality of Opportunity and Its Place in Egalitarian 
Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006). 
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‘different’ because age distinctions can be compatible with equality of opportunity.30 People 
experience the benefits and detriments of different age groups over time and therefore stable 
age distinctions can be experienced by everyone who lives long enough to reach the age of that 
policy.31  
However, most age distinctions are not stable and can cause inequality of opportunity 
when age distinctions are altered or removed. For example, a mandatory retirement age may 
be altered or removed with the result that some will face the detriment of the policy, but those 
who reach retirement age after the policy is revoked or changed will not face the detriment that 
older age groups faced. Further, employees can leave employers with retirement ages and work 
for an employer without retirement ages. A retirement age may affect one group of workers 
who have remained with an employer with a retirement age while not affecting other workers 
who have left the employer to work for an employer that does not have a retirement age. 
Therefore, age-differential treatment does, in many instances, cause inequality of opportunity 
on the grounds of a trait that people are powerless to change and can therefore be analogous to 
paradigm forms of discrimination. 
However, as outlined in the previous section, Gosseries has argued for another way age 
distinctions can enhance equality of opportunity in a way that makes age discrimination 
‘special’. He argued that it is possible to design stable age distinctions that ensure opportunities 
are more equal than they would be otherwise by denying opportunities to older age groups that 
have experienced favourable opportunities and distributing these opportunities to younger age 
                                                          
30 Cupit, G in ‘Justice, Age, and Veneration’ (1998) 108 Ethics 702 noted that ‘the alleged injustice of age 
discrimination presents a puzzle’ because the ‘[s]tandard argument against discrimination – the argument from 
equalizing benefits – seems not to apply.’ 
31  This is the complete-life version of equality of opportunity. Nagel, N in Equality and Priority (Oxford 
University Press 1991) p 69, for example, argued that 'the subject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution 
of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole, from birth 
to death.’  
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groups that have experienced less favourable opportunities. In this way, age-differential 
treatment can work as positive action favouring disadvantaged age groups. However, it is also 
possible to design race or sex distinctions as positive action to enhance equality of opportunity 
by distributing opportunities to disadvantaged groups. For example, positive action in favour 
of disadvantaged racial groups, such as offering work training or initiatives to improve 
diversity in workforces, can be a means to enhance equality of opportunity. Indeed, the Equality 
Act 2010 permits positive action measures across the protected characteristics, albeit in rather 
restricted circumstances.32 This reveals that the principle of equality of opportunity can work 
in similar ways in explaining age discrimination and paradigm forms of discrimination. 
 
Social equality 
Another important account of the wrong of discrimination is social equality, which relates to 
the ideal that people should be able to participate in society as equals.33 Domination, oppression 
and social exclusion undermine people’s status as equals and therefore violate social equality. 
Discrimination can violate social equality by restricting access to power, wealth and political 
influence to particular social groups which in turn can lead to social exclusion. Race 
discrimination, for example, has had the effect of restricting access to power, wealth and 
political influence by erroneously ascribing the biological status of distinctness and otherness 
to groups of people. Social equality also explains that indirect discrimination can be wrong 
because structures may perpetuate the social domination of certain groups even if no individual 
deliberately tried to harm those subject to disadvantages. 
                                                          
32 See Equality Act 2010, s 158 and s 159. 
33 For an account of the social equality explanation of the wrong of discrimination, see Bagenstos, S ‘Employment 
Law and Social Equality’ (2013) 112 Michigan Law Review 225. 
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Social equality can also explain the harm of age discrimination. Age discrimination can 
undermine social equality by reinforcing age-based hierarchies of social status. Mandatory 
retirement, for example, can lock older people out of work which may lead to social exclusion 
and marginalisation of older people. Our society links work to social status and therefore 
removing people from work can have the effect of assigning older people to a lower social 
status. As Sandra Fredman has argued, '[d]eparture from the labour force frequently gives the 
impression that individuals are no longer active contributors to society’.34  
There are examples of age stereotyping that also undermine the social status of young 
people. For example, young people are perceived as less reliable, less committed and less 
motivated in their work.35 Young people can be discriminated against on these grounds which 
can make it harder for young people to be taken as seriously as older age groups, which can 
also have the effect of making it harder for young people to find employment and achieve 
promotion. This means that age discrimination can create hierarchies of status in ways that are 
analogous to how paradigm forms of discrimination can create hierarchies of status. 
 
Autonomy 
Another important principle to consider in determining the wrong of discrimination is that 
discrimination can undermine autonomy. John Gardner defines autonomy as ‘the ideal of a life 
substantially lived through the successive valuable choices of the person who lives it, where 
valuable choices are choices from among an adequate range of valuable options’.36 Gardner 
                                                          
34 Fredman, S 'What do we Mean by Age Equality?' (2001) Paper to the IPPR Seminar on Age as an Equality 
Issue 30. 
35 See Sargeant, M ‘Young Workers and Age Discrimination’ (2010) 26 The International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 467. 
36 Gardner, J ‘On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 167 at 170. 
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has argued that discrimination violates autonomy when the discrimination is related to 
immutable characteristics and fundamental choices. Discrimination because of immutable 
traits, such as race and sex, violates autonomy because it results in restricting the choices of 
the victim of discrimination:  
 
Because these choices are based on our immutable status, our own choices can make 
no difference to them. And where the discrimination is endemic enough, we are left 
with too few valuable options to choose among and we are deprived of valuable choice 
over large swathes of our own lives.37 
 
Gardner has explained that discrimination on the ground of fundamental choices (such as 
religion) violates autonomy by attaching costs to an individual choosing between available 
valuable options. In this way, discrimination has the effect of foreclosing some meaningful 
choices. Discrimination law offers people the opportunity to make their own valuable choices, 
rather than have their lives dictated to by others.38 
Gardner has also argued that indirect discrimination violates autonomy because it 
exacerbates the low autonomy levels of groups that have been subject to widespread 
discrimination in the past. The indirect discrimination provisions enhance autonomy by 
removing disadvantages that attach to people’s immutable traits and fundamental choices.  
                                                          
37 Ibid, at 170. 
38 Ibid, at 171. 
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In a similar account to Gardner, Moreau has argued that discrimination is wrong 
because it attaches costs to people’s choices.39 For Moreau, ‘people should not be constrained 
by the social costs of being one race rather than another when they deliberate about such 
questions as what job to take or where to live.’40 On this account, anti-discrimination law 
protects people’s freedom to go about their lives with their choices being insulated from traits 
that are morally irrelevant, such as race and sex. 
Age discrimination also undermines autonomy in similar ways to paradigm forms of 
discrimination. Age is not a characteristic we can control and therefore age discrimination can 
reduce people’s options without people’s choices making a difference. For example, a 
mandatory retirement age forces older people out of work and therefore undermines older 
workers’ capacity to have control over their working lives. The age stereotyping that underpins 
and sustains age discrimination can also harm autonomy. Our society stereotypes older people 
as being in decline, lacking productivity and a burden to society. If older people internalise the 
message that they are incompetent, then they are likely to lose self-esteem potentially resulting 
in a lack of confidence to act with conviction when making important life decisions. 
 
Discrimination as disrespect 
Another feature of why we object to discrimination is connected to the disrespect that the act 
communicates. For example, we object to racism not just because of autonomy harms or 
because it undermines equality of opportunity but also because the treatment communicates 
that the victim has a degraded moral status. There are subtly different accounts of the respect 
                                                          
39 Moreau, S ‘What is Discrimination?’ (2010) 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs 143. 
40 Ibid, at 48. 
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explanation of discrimination. The first account is that discrimination is wrong when a 
discriminator is motivated by prejudice.41 Prejudice occurs when a person acts on the belief 
that another person deserves less respect than others because of their social-group membership. 
This includes racist, sexist or ageist treatment. 
Another version is the theory that discrimination is wrong when it undermines the 
victim’s self-respect. As Rawls has argued, disrespectful treatment is likely to undermine the 
self-respect of people subject to the action since how other people treat us affects our self-
esteem. And, for Rawls, self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important primary good.’42  
Deborah Hellman has defended another account that identifies the wrong of 
discrimination in the ‘social meaning’ of the discriminator’s actions rather than the thought 
process of the discriminator or the impact discrimination has on individuals or groups.43 
Discrimination is wrong, Hellman has argued, because it demeans, and discrimination demeans 
when the treatment communicates that the victim is less worthy of concern and respect. This 
can include treatment that conveys a message that a person has a diminished moral worth 
because a person’s life and their interests are less important or valuable than others, for 
example, treatment that is straightforward prejudice, including racist treatment that demeans 
by ranking people according to their skin colour and sexist treatment that ranks men above 
women. However, unjustified demeaning treatment also includes treatment that is not as 
egregious as straightforward prejudice but nonetheless is insulting, insensitive or can 
reasonably be interpreted to communicate that particular people have a lower status.   
                                                          
41 Cavanagh, M in Against Equality of Opportunity (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002) p 166 has identified wrongful 
discrimination as treating people ‘with unwarranted contempt’. 
42 Rawls, J A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2009) p 440. 
43 Hellman, D When is Discrimination Wrong? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2008). 
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For example, a lecturer who instructs black students to move to one side of the lecture 
hall and white students to move to the other side of the lecture hall because the lecturer likes 
the aesthetic it produces rather than being motivated by any form of prejudice. Despite benign 
motives, we would still view this as offensive conduct because it is insensitive and humiliating 
to the students regardless of the motives of the lecturer.44 
Also, demeaning treatment can include relatively accurate generalisations about a 
group of people when that generalisation reinforces ideas that particular social groups have a 
lower moral and social worth. For example, if we assume that a pregnant woman taking 
maternity leave is likely to reduce that person's productivity compared to men over the long 
term, and an employer uses this as a reason to discriminate on the grounds of pregnancy by 
claiming that pregnancy is relevant when maximising profits, this is disrespectful 
discrimination because it reinforces the sexist idea that it is women’s responsibility to incur a 
disproportionate burden of reproduction.  
Importantly, however, some accurate generalisations are not necessarily disrespectful. 
For example, the assumption that women may need separate sports competitions because of 
physiological differences between men and women. This is unlikely to be considered 
demeaning because it can be justified as promoting the opportunity for women to compete 
successfully in sporting events. In this way, the generalisation enhances equality of opportunity 
and can be justified on this basis.  
Demeaning treatment includes treatment that communicates a false judgment that a 
person has a lower social worth. This includes treatment that communicates that a person has 
less to contribute to society, whether economically or socially, because of a characteristic they 
possess. For example, rejecting a woman job applicant on the assumption that women are less 
                                                          
44 Ibid, 26. 
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productive than men or acting on assumptions that certain racial groups are less intelligent and 
capable. This treatment can also demean because the stereotypes that underpin the treatment 
can be used to legitimise existing social arrangements which in turn work by keeping certain 
groups ‘in their place’. For example, people may correctly perceive certain ethnic groups as 
occupying lower social strata. They may conclude from this that the explanation for these 
groups occupying the lower social strata is that these groups are unintelligent, lazy etc. And 
from these stereotypes they conclude that it is justified to discriminate against these groups.  
Age-differential treatment can demean in ways that are analogous to how race or sex-
differential treatment demean. Age discrimination can reflect assumptions that particular age 
groups have diminished moral or social worth. For example, age discrimination can convey 
that older people are useless, senile and a burden to society. Older people are also stereotyped 
as greedy and selfish and, as a result, depriving needier groups of wealth and opportunities.45 
Age discrimination can also stereotype the young as dangerous, untrustworthy and unreliable.  
We can find examples of disrespectful age discrimination in cases. In ET in Dove v 
Brown & Newirth Ltd46, the ET held that nicknaming someone 'gramps' amounted to less 
favourable treatment because these comments were disrespectful and hurtful. The ET in Nolan 
v CD Bramall Dealership Ltd t/a Evans Halshaw Motorhouse Worksop47 held that age-related 
'banter’, including introducing an employee as the '104 year old Service Team Leader' and 
changing that employee’s number plate from 'OAB' and to 'OAP’, was less favourable 
treatment on the grounds of age. In James v Gina Shoes Ltd,48 the EAT held that it was less 
                                                          
45 For an example of this stereotyping, see David Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their 
Children's Future-and Why They Should Give it Back (London: Atlantic Books 2011). 
46 [2016] UKET/3301905/2015 
47 [2012] UKET/2601000/12. 
48 [2011] UKEAT/0384/11/DM. 
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favourable treatment to make remarks reflecting age stereotypes, including the remark directed 
at the complainant 'you can’t teach an old dog new tricks’. Each of these examples includes 
treatment that conveys negative and insulting assumptions about age or treatment that is likely 
to humiliate or undermine the self-respect of the victim. This ageist treatment is offensive for 
the same reasons we find racist or sexist treatment offensive. 
 
The usefulness of age distinctions in social and economic policy 
As outlined above, Mazák AG has asserted that age should, nonetheless, be considered as a 
non-suspect ground because many age distinctions are useful for achieving social and 
economic objectives rather than being demeaning. Similarly, Posner and Gosseries have argued 
that age distinctions are simple to administer and can be relatively reliable proxies which can 
reduce the costs of pursuing important social goals and that this makes age discrimination 
‘different’ from other forms of discrimination.  
It is certainly true that age distinctions can be useful in social and economic policy. 
This may explain why the Equality Act 2010 does not protect people under 18 years of age in 
relation to the field of goods, facilities and services. There are many examples of policies in 
these contexts where differential treatment directed at children is necessary to promote social 
and economic policies, including policies such as compulsory education for children, alcohol 
restrictions by age, smoking restrictions etc. We can justify these policies because age is a 
strong proxy for many characteristics at young age, including intellectual development, 
maturity and physiological developments, which can make it efficient to use age proxies to 
promote valuable social ends, including educational development and health. Furthermore, if 
these policies are stable over time, they can be consistent with equality of opportunity as people 
can experience the age distinction for about an equal number of years. 
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This argument does not, however, demonstrate that age is necessarily different and a 
prima facie less serious ground of discrimination. While it is true that age distinctions in social 
and economic policy can aim to grant people equal opportunities to access important social 
goods, for example, compulsory education under the age of 16 is a policy that ensures that 
everyone has the opportunity to have an education at the time of life when it is most likely to 
have a beneficial effect to the individual and society, importantly, as I have explained above, 
race or sex distinctions can also be justified on the grounds of advancing equality when the 
policy assists disadvantaged groups. Therefore, many age distinctions can be justified for the 
same reasons that many race or sex distinctions are justified, namely to advance equality.  
Furthermore, protected characteristics under anti-discrimination law, such as sex, are 
used relatively widely in social and economic policy yet still considered serious grounds of 
discrimination. The same can be true for age as a protected characteristic. For example, sex 
distinctions in sports reflect differences in strength and stamina between men and women, and 
sex-segregated sports has the positive outcome that women can thrive in sports to the extent 
that may not be possible without this policy.49 Single-sex establishments, such as prisons and 
domestic violence shelters, aim to ensure women are not put under psychological distress by 
the presence of men in vulnerable situations.50 Further, special services for maternity and 
pregnancy directed at women promote positive social ends.51  
We consider these policies as useful rather than demeaning. Nonetheless, we recognise 
that sex distinctions can cause serious harms even though there are contexts where sex 
                                                          
49 Equality Act 2010, s 195 permits sex-segregation in sports events provided ‘strength, stamina or physique of 
average persons of one sex would put them at a disadvantage compared to average persons of the other sex as 
competitors in events involving the activity.’ 
50 Equality Act 2010, s 27 provides for provision of single sex provision of services if the service would be 
provided more effectively this way or if there if only persons from a particular sex that need that service. 
51 Ibid. 
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distinctions are useful in social and economic policy. Similarly, age distinctions can be useful 
in social and economic policy but age-differential treatment can, in other contexts, cause 
serious harms, including, as I argue in this article, perpetuating oppressive relations, 
stereotyping people, expressing animosity and substantially reducing the autonomy of people. 
This means that there ought to be a high level of judicial scrutiny for these sorts of harms while 
also recognising that age-differential treatment can be useful and justified in some contexts.  
 
Revisiting UK Age Discrimination Case Law 
I have established that age discrimination can inflict harms that are equivalent to the harms of 
paradigm forms of discrimination, including violating equality of opportunity, social equality, 
autonomy and respect. It is essential, then, that the courts, when evaluating whether impugned 
treatment is unjustified and unlawful, should consider the extent to which the impugned 
treatment violates these principles. To illustrate this theory of age discrimination, I consider 
Seldon, Lockwood and Carson and Reynolds, and contrast the theory of age discrimination 
defended in this article to the approaches in these cases.  
 
Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes 
Seldon is the leading UK case on mandatory retirement ages. The claimant, a partner in a firm 
of solicitors, was compulsorily retired from his partnership at age 65 in accordance with the 
retirement age contained in the partnership deed. The law firm argued that the retirement age 
was lawful because it was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. They argued 
that the retirement age supported the following legitimate aims: (1) ensuring the law firm’s 
associates have opportunities to reach partnership; (2) facilitating planning of the partnership 
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by opening vacancies; and (3) limiting the need to undertake performance management reviews 
for older workers, thereby creating a congenial and supportive culture in the firm. 
The Supreme Court offered guidance on the aims that are capable of justifying age-
differential treatment. The Court held that only social-policy aims are capable of justifying 
measures that engage the direct age discrimination provisions. Social-policy aims include a 
wide variety of aims related to employment policy, the labour market or vocational training 
and can be divided into two categories. The first category of legitimate aims are aims that 
promote 'inter-generational fairness’, and this includes policies such as ‘facilitating access to 
employment for young people, sharing work fairly between the generations and enabling older 
people to remain in the workforce’. 
The second category of legitimate aims relates to protecting 'dignity’, and this includes 
aims of avoiding placing older workers in incapacity or underperformance processes. Increased 
monitoring and performance evaluation, the Court held, may lead to dismissals prior to the 
normal age of retirement, undermining the dignity of older workers. 
The Supreme Court remitted the issue of whether the impugned retirement age was 
proportionate to the ET where it was held that the retirement age was proportionate. The 
claimant appealed to the EAT where it was also held that the retirement age was 
proportionate.52 A key factor in this finding was that the claimant had consented with equal 
bargaining power to have the retirement age as part of the partnership deed of the defendant 
law firm.  
 
 
                                                          
52 EAT [2014] UKEAT/0434/13/RN. 
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Commentary 
Contrary to the findings in Seldon, dismissing older workers in order to avoid capability 
assessments to preserve the ‘dignity’ of older workers should not be capable of justifying 
retirement ages. The ‘dignity’ aim violates the respect principle because it implies the insulting 
message that older workers should be removed from employment because they may be 
incapable. As Alysia Blackham has argued, using dignity to justify unequal treatment in this 
way can ‘embed age stereotypes in equality law’ concerning the competence of older 
workers.53  There is no compelling empirical evidence to support the general claim that job 
performance declines with age.54 Making assumptions about older workers capabilities without 
assessing their actual capabilities as individuals implies that older workers have a diminished 
social worth because of their age. Furthermore, while capability assessments may cause 
embarrassment, they are less likely to be demeaning than dismissing workers on the assumption 
that older workers are bad workers.  
The other group of aims identified by the Supreme Court, namely 'inter-generational 
fairness' aims, are, in contrast, legitimate. Inter-generational fairness aims can aim to create job 
and promotion opportunities for younger age groups that can promote equality of opportunity 
by requiring access to income and work to be withheld from those who have held employment 
for a considerable time (older workers) and granted to age groups who experience relatively 
high unemployment (young people). While the retirement age in Seldon is unlikely to create 
complete equality of opportunity for each worker in the law firm because some workers might 
leave before facing the detriment of the retirement age, the law firm’s retirement age can work 
                                                          
53 Blackham, A ‘Interrogating the ‘Dignity’Argument for Mandatory Retirement: An Undignified Development? 
(2018) Industrial Law Journal at 21. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwy013. 
54 See McEvoy G and Cascio W ‘Cumulative Evidence of the Relationship between Employee Age and Job 
Performance’ (1989) 74.1 Journal of Applied Psychology 11. 
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to create a wider equality of opportunity by granting opportunities to groups who may not have 
promotion opportunities if the older workers did not retire. 
Inter-generational fairness can also promote social equality by distributing 
opportunities to younger people who are disadvantaged because of lack of experience. Youth 
unemployment rates are much higher than unemployment in other age groups.55 Social equality 
holds that it is legitimate to take measures to encourage young people into employment to 
ensure they have a chance to participate productively in society as equals with other age groups.  
Inter-generational fairness, therefore, is positive action in favour of disadvantaged 
young people, which is a means to achieving equality. This aim is legitimate provided it does 
not have the effect of stigmatising older people or marking them as inferior.  
However, it is important to consider whether the retirement age actually furthers the 
legitimate aim of inter-generational fairness. It can be argued that inter-generational fairness 
relies upon the lump-of-labour fallacy, which holds that removing some people from work 
creates more opportunities for others. This is a fallacy because the economy does not hold a 
fixed level of jobs where removing some from work frees up other employment. 
However, while it is true at the macro level of the economy that there are not a finite 
number of jobs, nonetheless, individual workplaces, such as the law firm in Seldon, can offer 
a relatively fixed number of jobs.56 It is possible in these circumstances that a retirement age 
can free up opportunities for promotion and hiring. Therefore, a retirement age can further the 
aim of inter-generational fairness.  
In assessing the justifiability of the retirement age in Seldon, it is essential to determine 
whether the retirement age promotes social equality and equality of opportunity, to the extent 
                                                          
55 See ONS, Labour Market Statistical Releases. 
56 Fredman, S 'The Age of Equality' in Sandra Fredman and Sarah Spencer (eds), Age as an Equality Issue: Legal 
and Policy Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2003). 
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that justifies the seriousness of the interference with the claimant’s interest in being free from 
the burden of the retirement age. Further to this, we can consider the principles that explain the 
harms of discrimination, including social equality, equality of opportunity, autonomy and 
respect. Importantly, while retirement ages can promote equality of opportunity and social 
equality by granting work opportunities to younger people and under-represented groups, 
retirement ages can hinder the capacity of older workers to participate in the workforce as 
equals to other age groups, and therefore retirement ages can undermine social equality for 
older people. Further, retirement ages can violate autonomy when the policy is unilaterally 
imposed on workers. 
However, the courts and tribunals could quite appropriately come to the decision that 
the retirement age was proportionate and lawful in Seldon. The claimant in Seldon had an equal 
bargaining power and at the time of signing the partnership agreement did not question the 
retirement age contained in the agreement. This mitigated some of the deleterious effects of 
the retirement age by respecting the autonomy of the claimant. In upholding the principle of 
autonomy, it was reasonable for the ET and EAT to find that the retirement age reflected the 
agreed mutual interests of the partners and younger workers. Furthermore, the claimant’s 
consent to the retirement age also mitigated the harm to social equality since the claimant was 
able to negotiate his employment terms as an equal in his role as a partner. This also meant that 
the retirement age policy was consistent with the respect principle by not unilaterally imposing 
a retirement age. 
 
Lockwood v Department of Work and Pensions & Anor 
This case concerned a policy of lower redundancy pay for younger workers. The claimant 
began working at the Department for Work and Pensions ('DWP') at 18 years of age. She 
continued working at the DWP for eight years until she was 26 years old. The claimant then 
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applied for redundancy and was accepted. The redundancy scheme entitled her to £10,849.04. 
However, the same scheme would have entitled her to significantly more money if she were 
over 30 years of age and had worked the same number of years at the DWP. The claimant 
argued this was direct age discrimination because it treated her less favourably because she 
was a young employee. 
The ET held that there were differences between the different age groups that meant 
that those below the age of 30 were not treated less favourably than those above the age of 30.57 
The ET held that even if they were wrong about this, the treatment was a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim. The ET relied on the assumption that older people need more 
redundancy pay because they are more likely to have families than young people and this meant 
that they have greater financial obligations and have a harder time traveling to find work. It 
was a legitimate aim, the ET and the EAT upheld, to financially cushion older workers who 
are in a more vulnerable position than younger workers.58 
The ET also held that the measure was proportionate because the redundancy scheme 
was reasonably necessary to the aim of offering a financial cushion, and this legitimate aim 
outweighed the discriminatory effects of the scheme. The means were reasonably necessary 
because administrative workability required the use of clear bands so that everybody knew the 
pay they were entitled to. Levelling up younger workers’ pay would achieve equality but would 
be expensive. And levelling down older workers’ pay to match younger workers would not 
adequately provide a financial cushion for older workers. 
The EAT upheld the ET’s decision and the claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal.59 
The Court of Appeal held that the redundancy scheme engaged the direct age discrimination 
                                                          
57 [2011] ET/1808694/07, 101539/08, 115515/10. 
58 [2013] UKEAT 0094/12/0402. 
59 [2013] EWCA Civ 1195, [2014] 1 All ER 250. 
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provisions. The claimant’s comparator was an employee over 35 who had worked for the DWP 
for the same amount of time as the claimant. The comparator would receive at least twice what 
the claimant received and it followed that the claimant was treated less favourably and was so 
treated because of her age. However, the Court of Appeal found that the DWP had adopted a 
proportionate means to achieve the legitimate aim of producing a financial cushion for older 
workers.  
 
Commentary 
In Lockwood, the redundancy policy assumed that young people are less likely to be 
encumbered than older people because they are less likely to have dependants or to be married, 
and therefore, on average, will find it easier to obtain employment in a shorter amount of time 
than older people. People in their 30s will need more redundancy pay to cover what may be a 
longer period of unemployment or underemployment.  
Is this a legitimate aim? The academic literature has cast doubt on the assumption that 
young people find it easier to obtain employment than older people, particularly because the 
evidence demonstrates that young people have a much higher unemployment rate than older 
workers.60 In addition, the aim of financially cushioning older workers may violate the respect 
principle by offering lower concern and respect for younger age groups. As established in the 
previous section of this article, age-differential treatment can inflict harms that are analogous 
to the harms of paradigm forms of discrimination, including prejudice and stereotyping that 
communicates that particular groups have a diminished social and moral worth. I have 
explained that even ‘accurate’ generalisations can be disrespectful because they can reinforce 
stereotypes that imply that particular groups have a lower moral and social worth. It follows 
                                                          
60 Blackham, A ‘Falling on Their Feet: Young Workers, Employment and Age Discrimination’ (2015) 44.2 
Industrial Law Journal 246 at 254 
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that even if the generalisation in Lockwood that young people are more ‘flexible’ in finding 
work is an accurate categorisation, this treatment can still be wrong if it reinforces disrespectful 
ideas about young people. Is this harm present in the redundancy policy in Lockwood?  
The redundancy policy does not necessarily represent animus or dislike for younger 
groups. However, the aim of the policy to cushion older workers in a period of unemployment 
relies on stereotypes about young people, namely, it reflects a generalisation that young people 
will react differently to unemployment when compared to older people. The ET reasoned that 
'[i]ndividuals in the younger categories and in their twenties can generally be expected to react 
more easily and more rapidly to the loss of their jobs and greater flexibility can, in general, be 
expected of them given their lesser family and financial obligations’.61 The ET referred to 'the 
average date of marriage was 34 for women, and 38 years for men' as an explanation for why 
greater financial assistance was needed for people in their 30s compared to people in their 20s. 
This assumes that young people have an easier time finding employment and do not face the 
difficulties that older people face. 
While this is not a stereotype that amounts to straightforward prejudice against young 
people, the stereotype does ignore people's individual circumstances and, as a result, can be 
unfair to young people who do face significant disadvantages in finding employment. People 
under 30 years of age are less likely to be married with children but many people of this age 
have family and financial obligations comparable to or exceeding that of older work colleagues. 
Although younger, they may have dependent parents, disabled siblings, cousins etc as well as 
children, any of whom they may be supporting financially. They may face the difficulty of 
upending their family life by moving locations to find employment.  
                                                          
61 [2011] ET/1808694/07, 101539/08, 115515/10 [27]. 
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Also, as Blackham has argued, ‘[j]ust because young people do not have a mortgage or 
children does not mean that they lack onerous financial commitments or have less “need” for 
redundancy payments’.62 Young people may have as much difficulty paying rent in a period of 
unemployment as older people may face in paying a mortgage.  By assuming that young people 
do not face the difficulties that people over 30 years of age face, the DWP were treating young 
people less favourably based on stereotypical assumptions about their private lives, and, in 
doing this, the impugned policy communicated that the interests of young people are of less 
concern and value. On this basis, the aim of financially cushioning older workers should not 
be capable of justifying the redundancy policy in Lockwood.  
However, it is possible that the redundancy scheme could have been justified by an 
argument that it supports inter-generational fairness by creating employment opportunities for 
young people (which I have established as legitimate in the discussion of Seldon above). For 
example, the DWP could have argued that higher redundancy payments for older workers can 
encourage older workers to leave who might otherwise not have done so, which may create 
available space for more junior employees. This aim is legitimate because young people are 
often disadvantaged in the employment market because of lack of experience, and it is 
legitimate to give young people a chance to gain experience and develop their careers. 
A relevant consideration in determining whether the scheme was necessary to achieve 
the aim of inter-generational fairness is to consider that the aim could not be achieved as 
effectively if redundancy pay was equal for younger and older workers. Paying older workers 
more than younger workers is necessary to incentivise a greater proportion of older workers to 
vacate their places to leave room for younger workers. The alternative method of equal pay 
will not achieve this aim so effectively.  
                                                          
62 Blackham (n 60) at 257. 
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However, the DWP did not introduce the inter-generational fairness aim of creating 
opportunities for young people, and we therefore are unable to assess the evidence of whether 
the scheme is likely to have the benefit of creating enough jobs for young people to justify its 
discriminatory effects on the claimant. Absent this evidence, the policy should be considered 
unjustified age discrimination. 
 
R v SS for Work and Pensions Ex p Carson and Reynolds63 
The claimant was unemployed and in receipt of jobseekers and income support, which 
amounted to £41.35 per week. Had the claimant been over 25 years of age, they would have 
been entitled to £52.20 per week. She argued that this policy violated Article 14 of the ECHR 
because it was discriminatory on the grounds of age.  
The House of Lords held that the policy engaged Article 14 and Article 8 of the ECHR, 
but held that the policy was justified on the grounds that younger people tend to earn less in 
work which means that a lower rate of jobseekers and income support reflects a lower 
proportion of income that younger people are likely to receive in work.64 Further, young people 
tend to have lower expenses, the Court held, because they are more likely to share 
accommodation, including sharing accommodation with parents who may also offer financial 
support. The policy was also justified, the Court held, as a way to discourage young people 
living independently which may lead to greater use of scarce resources such as housing.65 In 
finding this, Lord Rodger said: 
 
                                                          
63 [2005] UKHL 37; [2006] 1 AC 173. 
64 Ibid, para 37-40, 45. 
65 Ibid. 
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 ... There is no doubt that the relevant Regulations, endorsed by Parliament deliberately 
gave less to those under 25. But that was not because the policy-makers were treating 
people under 25 years of age as less valuable members of society. Rather, having regard 
to a number of factors, they judged that the situation of those under 25, as a class, was 
different from that of people of 25 and over, as a class.... In my view ... it was open to 
ministers and Parliament, in the exercise of a broad political judgment, to differentiate 
between the two groups and to set different levels of benefit for them. Drawing the 
bright demarcation line at 25 was simply one part of that exercise ....66 
 
In finding this, the Court held that age-differential treatment is not a ‘suspect’ ground and 
therefore age generalisations are not degrading to particular social groups in the way that race 
or sex generalisations are. Since there was a rational basis for the age classification, the age-
differential treatment was justified. 
 
Commentary 
Were the House of Lords right to assume that the policy was justified because it had a rational 
basis and was not disrespectful to younger age groups? To answer this, we can assess the 
justifications of the policy and examine whether the policy reveals any invidious assumptions 
about age groups. In finding the lower job seekers and income support policy justified, the 
House of Lords assumed that younger people can have lower housing costs while unemployed 
because they are more likely to share accommodation, particularly with their parents who may 
not charge their adult children rent. This assumption, however, was not evidenced, and it may 
be questioned that housing costs are lower for young people. Older people are more likely to 
                                                          
66 Ibid, para 45. 
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share accommodation with a spouse which can lead to the contribution of a spouse’s salary 
towards housing costs.   
Further, the assumption that young people can move in with their parents to lower 
housing costs pays scant regard to individual circumstances of young people. Many young 
people’s parents may have died and many are estranged from their parents. Young people in 
these circumstances may have needs exceeding that of older people while unemployed. It is 
also insulting for a policy to assume that these people deserve lower assistance on the grounds 
that they can expect to rely on their parents. Some people are forced to live independently from 
family because they may be at risk of abuse. In this way, the lower rates for people under 25 
years of age unfairly punishes unemployed young people who must live independently. 
Also, the aim of encouraging young people to live with parents communicates that 
young people should refrain from attempting to live fully independent lives.  This reflects a 
negative stereotype that young people should not be considered fully capable adults. It also 
harms the autonomy principle by reducing people’s capacity to develop independence during 
adulthood and undermines social equality by placing young people in a precarious financial 
position that can reduce their capacity to participate in society as equals with other age groups.  
In summary, the policy reflects a disrespectful indifference to the interests of younger 
people by connecting unsupported generalisations about young people to low levels of social 
assistance thereby classifying young people as less entitled to the social assistance necessary 
to have sufficient means to live a dignified life. 
If we are to accord sufficient weight to the seriousness of age discrimination as a moral 
problem, then the age-differential treatment in Carson and Reynolds should be deemed 
unjustified and therefore in breach of Article 14. 
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Conclusion 
Much of the case law has failed to rigorously scrutinise the justifiability of impugned age-
differential treatment, including failing to scrutinise the legitimacy of defendants’ aims and 
failing to engage with the discriminatory impact of the treatment. In this way, the courts have 
treated age discrimination as a less serious ground of discrimination requiring a low level of 
scrutiny. However, this article has argued that age discrimination should not be considered a 
less serious form of discrimination. I have established that age discrimination can undermine 
the same principles that paradigm forms of discrimination also undermine, including: creating 
inequality of opportunity by disadvantaging people because of a trait that is outside a person’s 
control; undermining social equality by creating a hierarchy of social status between different 
groups; violating autonomy by diminishing people’s capacity to have control over their lives; 
and violating respect by communicating that particular groups have a diminished moral or 
social worth.  
It follows that the courts should rigorously scrutinise age distinctions for violations of 
these principles and only permit age distinctions that are strictly tailored to enhance equality 
or other important values. For example, when evaluating the justifiability of a mandatory 
retirement age, the courts should identify that retirement ages can undermine social equality by 
removing older people from socially productive work and can violate autonomy by removing 
older people from work against their will. Further, the courts should reject aims that reflect 
negative stereotypes or prejudice against particular age groups. For example, it should not be 
possible to justify retirement ages on the grounds that this can avoid the possibility of capability 
assessments for older workers since this reflects the negative stereotype that older people are 
less capable.  
This argument has implications for the legislation on age discrimination. It is 
problematic that the Framework Directive and the Equality Act 2010 has a general justification 
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test for direct unequal treatment on the grounds of age when the legislation only permits 
unequal treatment relating to other protected characteristics in much more restricted 
circumstances, such as when the treatment is a genuine occupational requirement or if the 
treatment fits in the positive action criteria. The legislation therefore creates a hierarchy of 
protected characteristics with age-differential treatment being more capable of legal 
justification than other grounds. This can encourage the perception that age discrimination is a 
less serious form of discrimination.  
There are two possible responses to create legal parity between age and other protected 
characteristics under anti-discrimination law to recognise that age can be as serious a form of 
discrimination as other grounds. Firstly, the legislation can remove the general justification test 
for age distinctions to ensure there is equivalent exceptions to the prohibition of age-differential 
treatment as the prohibition of race or sex-differential treatment. The disadvantage of this 
approach, however, is that it may make it harder to justify age-differential treatment that 
genuinely aims to assist disadvantaged groups. This is because age-differential treatment would 
have to fit into a specific exception under this approach to be lawful, such as the positive action 
provisions under the Equality Act 2010, which permits differential treatment to favour 
disadvantage groups. This exception is highly restrictive in the context of recruitment and 
promotion and therefore can limit age-based distinctions that can enhance equality.67 
A better, but likely controversial, approach, would be to introduce a general justification 
test across the range of protected characteristics to permit direct unequal treatment that is 
proportionate to a legitimate aim.68 This would ensure protected characteristics can be used to 
                                                          
67 See Equality Act 2010, s 159. 
68 Many reject the idea that there should be a general justification test for direct discrimination. It is argued that 
direct discrimination is more of an affront to dignity than indirect discrimination and therefore the law should 
make it more difficult to justify direct discrimination than indirect discrimination. Providing a general justification 
test for direct discrimination, so this argument goes, would subject direct discrimination to the same legal 
procedure as indirect discrimination which currently has a general justification test. See Gill, T and Monaghan, K 
‘Justification in Direct Sex Discrimination Law: Taboo Upheld’ (2003) 32.2 Industrial Law Journal 115 
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further equality or other important social and economic objectives in a way that is currently not 
possible due to the highly restrictive criteria for positive action measures. The approach would 
also ensure that the legislation would treat age discrimination as having an equivalent legal 
status as other protected characteristics. 
